A Public Asset Exposed: RNZ, Its Trustees and the 2026 Crisis

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1.0 Summary

On 9 November 2026, RNZ reported an $11.8m deficit. Its auditor also disclosed that the broadcaster had entered into a $5m overdraft facility without the required ministerial approvals. The accounts exposed failures inside RNZ and raised a question for the government that owns it. How well had it looked after the public's interest in the broadcaster?

The government had appointed directors for their commercial expertise. When the finances unravelled, shareholding minister David Seymour questioned RNZ's purpose and Prime Minister Christopher Luxon ruled out a bailout. That is the irony at the centre of this report. The ministers criticising RNZ were also responsible for monitoring the Crown's investment in it. RNZ's management and board have serious questions to answer. So do the ministers who appointed the board and were responsible for monitoring its performance.

Five findings follow from the public record.

1. **RNZ's financial controls failed. The board approved an overdraft facility without the required ministerial approvals. The shareholding ministers should explain how they followed up on earlier financial warnings.**
2. **Commercial experience is no guarantee of good oversight. New Zealand's finance company failures show how much can go wrong under commercially experienced boards.**
3. **Ministers made a case for protecting domestic cement production. Their public response to RNZ gave less attention to the services New Zealanders rely on, including emergency broadcasting.**
4. **RNZ faced funding pressure before the crisis. The headline record captures more criticism from coalition figures than defence of RNZ's public role.**
5. **Three criticisms of RNZ's coverage have different evidential strengths. The headline record can test some aspects of them.**

The public deserves an account of how RNZ was governed and monitored, along with a clear statement of which services the government intends to protect.

2.0 Blame and responsibility: the political context

David Seymour is right that an $11.8m loss at a publicly funded broadcaster demands a reckoning. Taxpayers are entitled to know how it happened and who should answer for it. His questioning of public ownership also puts the Crown's own oversight in view.

The loss arrived in a political climate already primed to read it one way. Seymour has said news media should "stop blaming the internet and start looking at their product". Winston Peters has attacked the media for decades, and in 2025 told RNZ the government would sooner or later cut its funding off. In a May 2026 interview Christopher Luxon warned an RNZ host, "I'd be careful saying that, John." Commentators on the right regularly accuse RNZ of bias (section 9). For critics who already believed that

public money breeds waste, the accounts seemed to prove the point before anyone had asked how the money was lost.

The response followed the same script. Seymour called the result "disastrous" and asked what RNZ's purpose is; in May he had predicted that its chief executive would not last much longer and called RNZ a tragedy. Paul Goldsmith, the minister responsible for RNZ, ruled out aid and called the loss a colossal mistake. Shane Jones said it was not credible that the board had missed it. Luxon ruled out a bailout. In the SocialHerd record, at least 15 headlines show ministers or coalition figures criticising RNZ, cutting its funding or warning it. Three show a politician defending it, all of them from Labour.

RNZ's financial reporting passed through management, the audit and risk committee and the board. Treasury advises the Crown as owner, and the shareholding ministers monitor the company's performance. Public reporting identified several points where further questions were warranted. Asked whether he had been remiss, Seymour replied, "You could argue that."You could argue that."

Seven of the eight people listed in the later board table have commercial or private-sector backgrounds, including the associate member. The government's appointments brought considerable business experience. Cutting roles can reduce spending. Improving the quality of financial reporting requires action from management and the board.

The public deserves to know who received financial information, who challenged it and what happened when the figures stopped adding up.

3.0 What went wrong at RNZ

RNZ reported an $11.8m deficit against a forecast deficit of $470,000. RNZ said $2m from land sales was incorrectly budgeted as revenue in its Statement of Performance Expectations. Personnel expenses ran $3.2m above budget, including $1.4m in redundancy payments, and operating expenses ran $6.4m above budget. The property disposal programme and Auckland relocation contributed to the operating variance.almost $12 million on income of about $70mran $1.85m over budget

The public record contained several reasons to ask how closely RNZ's finances were being monitored.

When	Warning sign
Dec 2024	The Herald reports RNZ's salary costs rose $5m in a year; Stuff reports accusations RNZ is "splashing cash"
Dec 2025	The $11m move into the TVNZ building is reported delayed by up to eight months
Mar–Apr 2026	The government's letter of expectation and a reported "stern letter" tell RNZ to rein in costs and stop relying on reserves and land sales
9 Jun 2026	The board approves a $5m overdraft facility. RNZ enters into it without the required ministerial approvals.
Aug 2026	RNZ announces 25–30 job cuts
2 Oct 2026	Chief financial officer Hilary Parker resigns hours after raising financial

When	Warning sign
	discrepancies; the board calls an emergency meeting
30 Oct 2026	RNZ says it will release its accounts only after the election
9–10 Nov 2026	RNZ reports an $11.8m deficit and proposes cuts equivalent to 58 full-time roles. The auditor identifies the overdraft breach.

Each of these was an invitation to ask questions. A $5m jump in salary costs, a delayed building move, a ministerial letter telling RNZ to stop living off reserves, an unexplained resignation by the chief financial officer and accounts held back until after an election: none was hidden, and none required access to RNZ's books to notice.

The Social Herds dataset captures five headlines about RNZ's finances after the CFO's departure and before the annual report. It records 78 headlines on the deficit and its fallout from 9 to 23 November. The CFO's departure, an emergency board meeting and the timing of the accounts gave reporters questions to pursue during the election campaign.

The public record shows several points at which RNZ's finances warranted closer scrutiny. The independent review should establish what the board, Treasury and shareholding ministers knew at each point, what they did in response, and whether earlier intervention could have reduced the loss.

4.0 Who was responsible for governance

RNZ is a Crown entity company. Its board governs the company. Under section 88 of the Crown Entities Act 2004, shareholding ministers appoint directors, oversee the Crown's interests and monitor performance. They can request information and review the company's operations and performance. Treasury is the Crown's primary ownership, governance and performance adviser.Crown Entities Act

The Crown Entities Act sets out the company board's role and accountability to shareholding ministers in sections 86 and 87 and includes specific board duties in sections 92 and 95. The Companies Act 1993 also applies. The Radio New Zealand Act protects the broadcaster's editorial independence.duty to ensure the financial responsibility of the Crown entityowed to the responsible ministermust not contravene, or agree to the entity contravening, the Actinformed and knowledgeable about the entity's business

On 9 June 2026 the board approved a $5m overdraft facility. RNZ entered into the arrangement without approval from the Minister of Finance and the Minister for Media and Communications. The auditor identified a breach of sections 160 and 162 of the Crown Entities Act. The facility was undrawn at 30 June. A director reportedly queried whether approval was needed and was assured by the CFO that it was unnecessary. The review should establish how the board checked that advice and who signed off on the arrangement.$5m overdraft without either minister's sign-off

The table shows the board's commercial experience and appointment dates. The July 2026 appointees joined after the June overdraft decision.

Member	Appointed	Commercial or private-sector background
Brent Impey	Sep 2024; chair Jul 2026	11 years as MediaWorks CEO; director of NZ Rugby, Yellow Pages Group, Devon Funds; chartered

Member	Appointed	Commercial or private-sector background
(chair)		accountant
Gracie MacKinlay	Sep 2024	Former CEO of Mighty Ape; accounting degree; audit committee chair
Mads Moller	Sep 2024	30+ years as tech entrepreneur; senior roles at IBM, Broadcom, Vodafone, Google
Andrew Szusterman	Oct 2025	MD of South Pacific Pictures; former MediaWorks and TV3 executive
Richard Dellabarca	Jul 2026	17 years on boards incl. NZX/ASX-listed companies; chartered accountant
Angela Busby	–	40+ years in financial services leadership
Ciara McGuigan (associate)	Jul 2026	CFO of EROAD; former CFO at TVNZ, MediaWorks and Sky
Paula Browning	Jul 2026	Creative-sector advocacy; IP law and policy

Source: RNZ Board of Governors. The table includes an associate member. The government appointed four of the seven directors who served during 2025/26. When appointing Impey, Goldsmith emphasised his financial and commercial experience.RNZ Board of Governors"we have appointed most of the people on the board"

Goldsmith held four portfolios in January 2026 and added Pacific Peoples in April. In August he took on defence and intelligence responsibilities, bringing the number of roles reported in this analysis to 11. That increase came after the June overdraft approval. The question for the Crown is how monitoring and follow-up were organised across the period.Justice and Media and CommunicationsDefence and responsibility for the GCSB and NZSIS

The commercial expertise ministers sought in their appointments makes the oversight question more pressing. If the Crown used that expertise as a reason to trust the board, what checks did it have in place to know when that trust needed testing?

5.0 What private sector failures show

New Zealand's finance company collapses show how much damage weak oversight can cause under private ownership.

New Zealand had its own version. Between 2006 and 2012, 67 finance companies collapsed. A parliamentary inquiry put losses at more than $3 billion, affecting 150,000–200,000 depositors, and named poor governance and management first among the causes. The Crown paid about $2 billion to depositors of nine companies that failed while covered by its retail deposit guarantee; estimates of the final net cost, after recoveries and fees, range from about $500m to almost $900m. The largest single payout went to depositors of South Canterbury Finance: $1.58 billion to more than 30,000 people, over 130 times RNZ's loss.

Commercial credentials and public reputations were no protection. Lombard Finance was chaired by Sir Douglas Graham, a former National justice minister and attorney-general, and another former justice minister, Bill Jeffries, sat on its board. It collapsed in April 2008 owing $127 million to 4,400 investors. In 2012 its four directors were found guilty of making false statements in a prospectus, and their appeals failed. Because Lombard failed before the deposit guarantee began, its investors, not taxpayers, carried the loss.

The strongest version of Seymour's argument deserves an answer. When a private company fails, its shareholders usually lose first; when a public entity fails, taxpayers pay directly. That is true of small failures. But when private failures are large enough, taxpayers pay too, as South Canterbury Finance and the global bank rescues showed.

The finance company cases show the limits of commercial credentials. RNZ's review should trace how information reached decision-makers and what they did with it.

6.0 How ministers responded when public services were at stake

The government's responses to Golden Bay Cement, Air New Zealand and RNZ show how differently ministers talked about resilience, financial performance and public value.

How ministers explained their responses	Golden Bay Cement	Air New Zealand	RNZ
Resilience: is it strategically important?	Yes. Luxon said the $60m grant was needed for national resilience; Willis said losing cement would leave New Zealand "massively exposed"	Not raised	Not raised, though RNZ is the designated emergency broadcaster
Patience: is it a downturn to ride out?	Willis called the grant "the least worst option"; Seymour "a necessary evil"	Peters urged patience. Luxon called the airline's performance poor.	Luxon: "we shouldn't have to bail out … their mistakes"; Seymour asked what RNZ's purpose is
Who benefits?	Fletcher Building's shareholders and cement buyers; the grant is not a loan and gives the Crown no shares	The airline's shareholders, the Crown included, and its passengers	Audiences relying on free news, emergency broadcasting and other public services

The Social Herds record captured 78 headlines about RNZ's deficit and fallout from 9 to 23 November. The cement grant drew 19 and Air New Zealand's loss drew 14 in their respective windows. The counts describe the briefing's selection across separate events and date ranges.

Event	Money involved	Headlines	Negative	Opinion or analysis

Event	Money involved	Headlines	Negative	Opinion or analysis
Golden Bay Cement grant (20 Jul – 6 Aug)	Up to $60m of public money	19	63%	10
Air NZ annual loss (28 Aug – 10 Sep)	$336m pre-tax loss	14	86%	8
RNZ deficit (9 – 23 Nov)	$11.8m loss	78	92%	24

The cement grant secured commitments to domestic production until at least 2040 and at least $150m of investment. Air New Zealand estimated that continued engine issues reduced earnings by about $190m after compensation, including the effects of extra leasing costs and reduced capacity. Its 2015 purchase of Pratt & Whitney engines for its Airbus fleet took place while Luxon was chief executive. Peters urged patience with the airline, and Luxon publicly criticised its performance.fuel prices and engine problems

The cement decision shows that ministers were prepared to explain what domestic capacity was worth protecting. At RNZ the same question deserves a public answer. What capacity does the country need for emergency broadcasting, regional coverage and Pacific and Māori journalism, and how will the government preserve it while requiring RNZ to restore financial control?

7.0 What New Zealanders own

To judge how well RNZ's trustees have served the public, it helps to be clear about what they are looking after. RNZ delivers what commercial media cannot afford to: free, reporting-led news, with a legal duty to stay independent. Under its Charter, RNZ is an independent public service broadcaster whose purpose is to serve the public interest, and the Radio New Zealand Act bars ministers from directing its news. It is the designated lifeline radio broadcaster in a civil defence emergency, carries Parliament on its AM network, and runs RNZ Pacific.

RNZ contributed 18,597 of 90,214 headlines, more than any other single outlet in the Social Herds dataset. It ranked first in every year covered.



SocialHerd dataset · 90,214 political headlines, Jun 2023 – 23 Nov 2026; Stuff group includes the Post and Press

Its headlines are free, while 97% of the Post's political headlines and 89% of BusinessDesk's sit behind a paywall. In 2026 it carried 913 headlines flagged for Governance, Capability or Integrity (Appendix B explains these flags), more than any single masthead. RNZ was again New Zealand's most trusted news brand in 2026, trusted by 57% of people.

That matters well beyond RNZ's own audience. A six-country study found that watching public broadcasting is more strongly linked to political knowledge than watching commercial broadcasting, especially where public broadcasters are independent and publicly funded. A comparison of four countries found that public service television gives news greater prominence and narrows the knowledge gap between advantaged and disadvantaged citizens, which matters for the Māori and Pacific audiences the current cuts put at risk. An informed public is a condition of democracy, not a by-product of it.

RNZ is not beyond criticism. RNZ National's radio audience has fallen since 2021, and a 2025 review found it was not connecting with much of the country. Those are fair questions about whether RNZ is a public service broadcaster that meets the needs of the public it serves. They are not a case against public broadcasting itself.

8.0 Leadership without a strategy

Protecting a public asset means more than auditing it after it fails. It means deciding what it is for, funding it to do that, and defending it in public. On each count the coalition fell short, and it did so inside a media system it had no plan for.

The pressure on news media is not new. The advertising that once paid for New Zealand journalism has moved to global platforms such as Google and Meta, which also carry news stories they do not pay to produce. In August 2023 the Labour government introduced the Fair Digital News Bargaining Bill to push the platforms to negotiate payment deals with New Zealand news media. Most media companies backed it; Google and Meta opposed it, and in opposition National's media spokesperson Melissa Lee called it "a

shakedown". When the coalition decided to proceed with it in 2024, ACT used the coalition's "agree to disagree" provisions to vote against it. After Lee was demoted, Paul Goldsmith took over the portfolio while still considering whether the bill was the best way to help media companies, and in December 2024 the government put it on hold.

Australia shows what the alternative looks like. Its 2021 News Media Bargaining Code prompted payments of almost AU$250m a year from Meta and Google to Australian news businesses. When Meta declined to renew its deals in 2024, Australia responded rather than retreating: in August 2026 its parliament passed a News Bargaining Incentive, a levy on the local revenue of Meta, Google, TikTok and LinkedIn that applies unless they strike deals with news publishers. Google has since ended a smaller funding deal in protest. Australia's public broadcasters gain on two fronts. The ABC secured deals with both Google and Meta and SBS secured a deal with Google. Separately, the Albanese government has committed to legislate five-year funding terms for the ABC and SBS to safeguard their independence, and is giving the ABC an extra $83.1m over two years from 2026–27, then $43m a year ongoing. When the platforms pulled back, Australia toughened its law and protected its public broadcasters. New Zealand shelved its bill and cut RNZ's funding in two consecutive budgets.

What followed in New Zealand was a series of stalled or piecemeal moves rather than a strategy. In 2025 Goldsmith released proposals to modernise media regulation, but there was no commitment to progress them, and he said governments could not fund media like they used to. Budget 2025 cut RNZ's funding by $18m over four years and set audience and trust targets; Budget 2026 cut it again. In May 2026 the government agreed to disestablish the Broadcasting Standards Authority and investigate self-regulation, removing a regulator before a replacement was in place. Newsroom co-editor Tim Murphy said Goldsmith had been "undone ... by National's media policy vacuum".

The Social Herds record includes three headlines showing political support for RNZ, all from Labour, and at least 15 showing criticism, funding cuts or warnings from coalition figures. These counts describe the selected headlines. Among 25 opinion and analysis headlines about RNZ from the CFO's exit to 23 November, 21 were coded negative. The Conversation, Newsroom and the Democracy Project also raised questions about RNZ's future and public role.threatening to cut funding is a form of censorship

Ministers argue they are protecting public money. Seymour has said editorial independence comes with accountability, and he returned to Morning Report in September 2026. The election also left the government in caretaker mode. Ministers could still explain which RNZ services they regarded as essential and how they expected the board to protect them.

9.0 Three claims about RNZ coverage

Criticism of RNZ's coverage predates the financial crisis. The three examples below concern a poll headline, the framing of an alcohol guidelines story and the balance of election airtime. Each calls for different evidence.

9.1 A capital gains tax poll (October 2024)

Economist Robert MacCulloch, republished on Breaking Views, said RNZ and the Herald misled the nation by reporting that 65% of New Zealanders supported a capital gains tax. The 65% counted anyone who backed a tax on any one of four asset types; support for each ranged from 57% for investment property down to 13%. The criticism of the headline figure is fair. But RNZ's headline read "Two-thirds of voters

support capital gains tax 'in some form'", with the qualifier included. The Herald's headline gave the 65% without it, so the charge fits the Herald better than RNZ.

9.2 Alcohol guidelines (July 2025)

David Farrar on Kiwiblog argued that RNZ's reporting implied lobbyists had halted a review of drinking guidelines. The Social Herds dataset includes four RNZ headlines on the issue between June and August 2025 and at least seven from other outlets. Testing Farrar's claim about what RNZ implied would require reviewing the articles and their sourcing.["campaign of misinformation"]

9.3 Election balance (October 2026)

Farrar also published a count of airtime, supplied by an unnamed third party, that rated TVNZ's and RNZ's coverage of minor parties as favourable, neutral or unfavourable. It suggested Opportunity and the Greens received five to seven times better coverage than ACT and NZ First, and the figures were reported as given. We found no published challenge to them. Yet no method was published either: not who did the counting, which programmes were included, or how "favourable" and "unfavourable" were decided. That matters, because a remark some viewers find offensive and others applaud could be scored either way. A count that cannot be checked cannot carry the weight placed on it.

The headline record provides a second measure of campaign coverage.



SocialHerd dataset · campaign headlines 1 Aug – 7 Nov 2026; parties matched by name and leader in headline text

RNZ gave Opportunity a smaller share of campaign headlines than the other outlets shown. Its Greens headlines were negative slightly more often than its average for party headlines (37% against 35%). Opportunity had the lowest share of negative headlines at each outlet shown. RNZ's share of headlines tagged opinion reached at most 4% across parties. These findings describe selected headline coverage. Evaluating Farrar's airtime claim requires programme-level data and published coding criteria.

10.0 Who pays the price

RNZ announced plans to cut the equivalent of 58 full-time roles after reporting the loss. By 22 November, the Herald reported that 26 staff were leaving. Four of the seven directors who served during 2025/26 remained on the board.

The coverage itself made the point. The Democracy Project said RNZ's staff are paying for failures at the top. Staff told The Spinoff the redundancies should start in management. The Post asked who pays the price for RNZ's $11.8m blunders. Coverage of the cuts has also raised fears for Māori journalism and for RNZ's Pacific services.

For audiences, the question is which reporting and services RNZ can sustain with a smaller workforce. That matters especially to people who rely on free news and to communities served by RNZ's Māori and Pacific coverage.

11.0 What New Zealanders should expect

The table sets out what the public record establishes and where the Crown still owes an explanation.

What New Zealanders should expect	What the record shows	What remains to answer
Protect the asset's purpose and capacity	RNZ faced funding pressure and announced cuts.	Which services and capacity will the Crown protect?
Oversee the board and the money	Ministers warned RNZ about costs. The auditor identified an overdraft breach.	What follow-up took place?
Appoint capable directors and hold them to account	The board had substantial commercial experience. Four 2025/26 directors remained.	How did the board scrutinise the accounts and the overdraft?
Defend the asset in public	The selected headlines include three showing support and at least 15 showing coalition criticism, cuts or warnings.	How do ministers describe RNZ's public value?
Apply one standard to public	Ministers cited resilience for cement and ruled out a	What criteria

What New Zealanders should expect	What the record shows	What remains to answer
money	bailout for RNZ.	apply when a public service is at risk?
Find out what went wrong	RNZ announced that it would commission an independent review.	Will ministers also account for the Crown's monitoring?

RNZ's review should examine the board's decisions and the information it received. The shareholding ministers should publish their own account of what Treasury and ministers knew, what follow-up they required, and which services the government intends to protect. The public should be able to see where responsibility lay before the deficit emerged and how accountability will work now.

Appendix A: The 2023 hires from Stuff

In 2023 RNZ hired heavily from Stuff, including Mark Stevens, Stuff's head of news, who became chief news officer and is now RNZ's acting chief executive. The Spinoff described an unusually large, one-way flow of senior Stuff staff to RNZ that year. RNZ said only seven of the 51 roles it advertised went to Stuff journalists, and the hiring followed a $25m funding boost.



SocialHerd dataset · RNZ headlines by byline, Jul 2023 – 23 Nov 2026

Byline matching identifies 11 journalists who moved from Stuff to RNZ; together they wrote 1,465 RNZ headlines. They filled specialist gaps (economy, housing, police, retirement and climate), wrote more analysis than other RNZ journalists (22% of their headlines against 6%) and show no sign of a slant: their headlines are negative at RNZ's usual rate (23%), and few name a political party at all.

Whether the hires drove up costs remains unresolved. RNZ's salary costs rose $5m in the year to late 2024. Appointment and pay records could help establish how much of the increase came from these roles.

Appendix B: Data and method

The source is the SocialHerd master dataset: 90,214 political headlines drawn from the Democracy Project's daily news briefings, June 2023 to 23 November 2026. It reflects what the briefings selected each day, not every story published.

Headlines about RNZ as an organisation were identified from their text and classification fields, then checked by reading each one. RNZ's reporting on other topics, and RNZ-commissioned polls, were excluded, leaving 349 headlines about RNZ itself. Each was assigned to a theme based on what the headline and its story were about. Party coverage was matched by party and leader names in the headline text, so party counts are directional.

Each 2026 headline also carries a flag describing the kind of question it raises:

- **Governance:** how institutions are designed and run, such as rules, oversight and who decides.
- **Capability:** whether a government or organisation can deliver what it promised.
- **Integrity:** honesty, conduct and conflicts of interest.

These flags are applied only to 2026, where the classification is current, and remain provisional. "Negative" describes a headline's tone, not whether it harmed its subject.

This report assesses the Crown’s stewardship through the documented decisions and public statements available as of 25 November 2026. The headline analysis describes coverage selected for the Democracy Project briefings.

Sources

- **Data:** SocialHerd master dataset, tbl_data_raw_AllData_2026.xlsx (90,214 headlines, June 2023 to 23 November 2026). Headlines cited without a link, such as the Herald's 1 October 2026 report on officials' advice about the cement grant, come from this dataset.
- **Political context (section 2):** Epoch Times: Seymour on news media · RNZ: blame games and media bashing · 1News: Seymour says RNZ's financial woes "disastrous"
- **What went wrong (section 3):** The Spinoff: RNZ's $11.8m budget blowout · RNZ: chief people officer leaves amid financial crisis
- **Governance and the law (section 4):** Crown Entities Act 2004 · Crown Entities Act: purpose and board duties · Public Service Commission: legislative background for board members · Individual duties of board members (s56) · Public Service Commission: responsibilities of members · The Spinoff: an unlawful loan · RNZ Board of Governors · Democracy Project: RNZ's staff are paying · Ministry for Culture and Heritage: Goldsmith's 2024 RNZ board appointments · Impey named RNZ chair · DPMC ministerial list, January 2026 · DPMC ministerial list, August 2026
- **Public and private failure (section 5):** CEPR: public interventions in the banking sector · GAO: TARP at 10 · 2008 UK bank rescue package · ONS: UK productivity measurement · ONS: our productivity puzzle · Finance company collapses (New Zealand) · Auditor-General: Treasury and the deposit guarantee · Sunday Star-Times: net cost of the guarantee · NZ Herald: bailout interest costs · Treasury: deposit guarantee payments completed · FMA: Lombard Finance · RNZ: Lombard four found guilty
- **Cement and Air NZ (section 6):** NBR: Luxon says cement rescue needed for resilience · 1News: Golden Bay Cement grant · Interest.co.nz: costs threaten import-only shift · The Post: corporate welfare · Democracy Project: cementing corporate welfare · RNZ: Peters on Air NZ · ODT: Air NZ loss · AeroTime: Luxon criticises Air NZ result; engine costs · Stuff: Rob Fyfe responds to Luxon · Air NZ selects Pratt & Whitney engines, 2015
- **Public broadcasting (section 7):** RNZ Charter · RNZ: About · AUT: Trust in News 2026 · Soroka et al.: public broadcasting and political knowledge · Curran et al.: media systems and political knowledge
- **Media strategy (section 8):** RNZ Mediawatch: news bargaining bill hits a snag · RNZ: media backing for the bill · NZ Herald: select committee and the bill · RNZ: bill officially put on hold · UTS: Australia's News Media Bargaining Code payments · The Daily Aus: News Bargaining Incentive · The Next Web: incentive passes parliament · B&T: Google ends funding deal · ABC submission on its platform deals · SBS submission on its Google deal · Australian minister: five-year funding terms for ABC and SBS · Central App: media regulation proposals · RNZ: government releases media proposals · National: Broadcasting Standards Authority to be disestablished · 1News: Candace Owens visa declined · ABC News: visa refusal reversed · ODT: Hipkins on funding threats as censorship
- **Bias charges (section 9):** Breaking Views: Robert MacCulloch on the capital gains tax poll · Kiwiblog: "campaign of misinformation" (July 2025) · Kiwiblog: State broadcasters coverage of minor parties (30 October 2026) · Daily Telegraph NZ: coverage of minor parties under scrutiny
- **Who pays (section 10):** Te Ao Māori News: fears for Māori journalism
- **Appendix A:** The Spinoff: the flow of Stuff's biggest names to RNZ
  RNZ financial result and response
  Crown Entities Act 2004 section 88
  Audit Office statement on RNZ's independent review
  Air New Zealand 2026 annual report