The problem

Four Australian-owned banks, ANZ, ASB, BNZ and Westpac, hold most deposits and loans. In 2024 the Commerce Commission called them “a highly profitable oligopoly”. It found no new provider of any scale since Kiwibank arrived in 2001, sporadic price competition and high customer inertia: 62% of customers had neither switched nor considered switching in three years. Treasury’s Cabinet paper said the banks’ high profits, compared with banks overseas, were at least partly explained by their market power.

What has been done

The Government accepted all 14 of the Commission’s recommendations. It explored new capital for Kiwibank, including asking KiwiSaver providers to invest $500 million, and held a parliamentary banking inquiry, which the press called “useful but timid”. Open banking was legislated and arrived in 2026. A TSB–Heartland merger was proposed in June 2026, creating a possible regional challenger.

What we still don’t know

Two years on, the coverage offers little evidence of whether bank margins, switching or lending rates have changed. Profits were reported in detail; whether reform is lowering what borrowers pay was not.

Solutions, and how to tell if they work

On the table: a stronger Kiwibank, open banking, a bank levy, and public ownership through buying back the BNZ. Whichever route is taken, the test is the same: report bank net interest margins, returns on equity and switching rates each year against the Commission’s 2024 baseline.

The problem

The official cash rate was held at 5.5% until August 2024, cut to 2.25% by late 2025, then raised to 2.5% in July 2026 and 2.75% in September as fuel prices lifted inflation. Households felt every move. In late 2023 the new Government removed the Reserve Bank’s employment objective, leaving it to focus on inflation alone. The Bank then went through a leadership crisis: Governor Adrian Orr resigned in March 2025 over a funding disagreement whose real reason was withheld from the public, and its chair resigned that August.

What has been done

A new Governor, Anna Breman, was appointed in September 2025. A transparency reform will publish how members of the Monetary Policy Committee vote. A Deposit Compensation Scheme protecting savings began in July 2025.

What we still don’t know

How quickly rate changes reach borrowers, and why. Whether the single inflation mandate has affected jobs. Politicians claimed credit for cuts (38 headlines linked the cash rate to the Government) but rarely explained the lags.

Solutions, and how to tell if they work

On the table: keep the single mandate, or restore the dual mandate. The test: report the gap between the cash rate and mortgage and deposit rates, alongside inflation and unemployment, against the Bank’s stated objectives.

The problem

Capital rules decide how much of their own money banks must hold against losses. Higher requirements make the system safer but can raise costs and favour the biggest banks. This became the central technical dispute of the period.

What has been done

The banking inquiry asked the Reserve Bank to stop raising capital requirements. After a review and what interest.co.nz described as “political pressure”, the Bank eased them in December 2025, saying it expected the savings to be passed on to customers. NBR later reported that the Bank had rejected expert advice in reaching the decision. Kiwibank then shelved part-privatisation.

What we still don’t know

Whether lower capital requirements are cutting lending rates or simply raising bank returns. Whether the system is still safe enough, and who bears the risk if it is not. Both questions were argued in the headlines but never measured.

Solutions, and how to tell if they work

Any change to capital or lending rules should come with a public statement of the risk to the banking system and who carries it in a crisis. The test: report the change in lending rates and bank returns after each change.

The problem

The people most harmed received the least coverage. In March 2024 half a million consumers were behind on loans. Arrears eased in 2026, but in May 89,000 people were still 90 days or more overdue, 74,000 of them renters. KiwiSaver hardship withdrawals doubled in 2023. A third of budgeting services faced funding cuts in 2024. On scams, banks were not required to reimburse victims, and estimates of annual losses ranged from $200 million to $2.3 billion.

What has been done

A minister responsible for scams (November 2024), an Anti-Scam Alliance with industry (July 2025), new scam-takedown powers, and an updated banking code focused on prevention (December 2025). Lending rules under the CCCFA were eased. Labour introduced a bill requiring banks to compensate scam victims in August 2024.

What we still don’t know

How many people are in serious debt, and in what circumstances. Whether scam victims are now reimbursed more often. What effect fewer budgeting services has had.

Solutions, and how to tell if they work

On the table: voluntary prevention through industry codes, or compulsory compensation for scam victims. The test: report scam losses and reimbursement rates, and serious arrears by household type, every year.

The problem

Budget 2025 changed KiwiSaver more than any other decision in the period. From July 2025 the Government contribution was halved to 25 cents per dollar, with a maximum of $260.72 a year, and removed for people earning over $180,000. Default employee and employer rates rise from 3% to 3.5% in April 2026 and 4% in April 2028. The Post called it a $2.4 billion cut to subsidies, and the Herald reported an effective tax increase on 180,000 families.

What has been done

Higher default contributions took effect in April 2026, and only 0.5% of members opted out. Sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds became eligible for the Government contribution. KiwiSaver then became an election contest: higher contributions (National), compulsion at 10% and enrolment from birth (New Zealand First), and “unfinished business” (Labour).

What we still don’t know

Whether New Zealanders are on track for an adequate retirement, and who is opting out of higher contributions and why. Coverage compared the offers but rarely asked what KiwiSaver is for. The gender gap in balances, first-home withdrawals and investment in New Zealand were each reported, but seldom together. Only 7.6% of KiwiSaver headlines used measurement language.

Solutions, and how to tell if they work

On the table: gradual increases, compulsion, enrolment at birth, and action on the “motherhood penalty”. The test: report contribution rates, balances by income and gender, and retirement adequacy against each change.

The problem

The paywalled share of banking coverage rose from 30% in late 2023 to 53% in the second half of 2026. Investment coverage was the most locked away, at 49%. The households most exposed to rising rates, arrears and scams are among the least likely to pay for specialist business news.

Where the free explanation came from

Interest.co.nz (578 headlines) and RNZ (687) provided most of the free explanation of how banks set prices, why the Reserve Bank moves rates and how KiwiSaver settings affect retirement.

Pros

It has acted on competition more than any government in the period, and its approach matches the Commission’s diagnosis of weak competition. Open banking is now in place. The 0.5% opt-out rate suggests higher KiwiSaver contributions are widely accepted. Making scams a ministerial responsibility names the problem and who is affected.

Cons

There is no evidence yet that margins or lending rates have fallen. Easing capital rules raises the safety question in test 3, and the Bank reportedly rejected expert advice in making that call. The Kiwibank capital plan stalled. Halving the KiwiSaver subsidy cut $2.4 billion and amounted to a tax increase for 180,000 families, and Labour said its new KiwiSaver policy lacked detail. Budgeting services lost funding, and scam victims have no right to reimbursement. Its bank-tax position moved from a possible campaign policy in May 2026 to ruled out in August.

Pros

Scam compensation goes straight at the protection gap in test 5 and states who pays: the banks. The dual mandate names workers as an affected group in monetary policy. A stated fiscal target gives its spending a measurable boundary.

Cons

Its KiwiSaver position was undefined in the coverage. “Opening up competition” came without a reported mechanism. The effect of the single mandate was argued, never measured, so the case for reversing it is equally untested. The coverage does not say whether compensation costs would fall on bank shareholders or be passed on to customers through fees. Labour was barely visible on banking until 2026.

Pros

It offers the most direct structural answer to the oligopoly: public ownership of a major bank. Compulsion and enrolment from birth address retirement adequacy head-on, and start saving early.

Cons

The BNZ buyback was widely criticised (one reaction collected by Stuff called it “extremely reckless”) and had no reported funding source after Winston Peters ruled out using KiwiSaver funds. The Herald costed compulsion at $12–28 billion to the Government, and an economist told RNZ it was not feasible. The “woke banks” penalty deals with political neutrality in lending rather than price, safety or protection.

Pros

It has a consistent position. Opening to foreign capital is one route to new entrants, which the Commission found had been missing since 2001.

Cons

It had few banking-specific policies in the coverage (29 headlines), and no reported position on scams, hardship or KiwiSaver adequacy. Whether easier foreign investment is raising productive investment has not been measured.

Pros

It targets the profits that Treasury linked at least partly to market power, and raises revenue that could be put to other uses.

Cons

A levy reduces bank returns, but the coverage did not explain how it would lower prices for customers, which is the question test 2 asks. The Greens were named in only 19 banking headlines, so their positions on competition, scams and KiwiSaver were largely invisible.